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Abstract: This article presents Marx’s conceptualization  about substantive equality and well-being, which have an organic relation with
human needs, labor and true liberty. Because this conceptualization is anchored in premises and criteria that are incompatible with the
capitalist understanding of these concepts, the paper uses it as a legitimate reference for the criticism of bourgeois social policy. This is
based on the understanding that although Marx did not emphasize the theme of social protection, his vast work includes a type of
sociology of well-being that must be unveiled.
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Introduction
What will be discussed here are the few but not unimportant efforts to detect in Marx1 a type of sociology2
of social well-being, which authorizes adopting it as a legitimate reference for critical analyses of capitalist social
policy. This understanding will certainly not be exempt from controversy, given the complex particularity of Marx’s
theoretical work and the multiplicity of existing Marxisms – each one considering itself to be the true and only
interpretation, if not the pioneer. This is not to mention the unproductive uses of Marx’s work, such as those that
reduce it to a type of Oracle of Delphi3 that could provide answers to any question addressed to it.
Contrary to this posture, this article seeks to benefit from Marx’s contribution to the theoretical criticism of
capitalist social policy, exactly as was initially stated: using it as a legitimate reference (that offers a wealth of
respectable insight) and for this reason, one that is free of codifications, oracular knowledge and untouchable
interpretations. Understanding that Marx did not create philosophical systems, recipes or scientific models, I am
also aware that I will have to confront the following challenges: a) to discover amid an expressive volume of issues
dealt with by Marx (many of them sparse and barely visible),  his probable sociology of well-being; b) to accept
responsibility for any possible errors committed; c) and finally, to risk being framed, by some “disgruntled epigone”4,
in some arbitrary typological categorization, among the various ones that exist in relation to Marx’s proposal.
The core of the text will address an implicit concept of well-being in Marx associated to his explicit
theoretical and political interest in human emancipation (or liberty) from the bondage of capital, mediated by the
conquest of real equality, which is contradictorily sought at the heart of capitalism itself. To conduct this
discussion I must complete a task that is not recent: understanding the key work of both the young and mature
Marx, prepared initially around historic and philosophical issues, and later, related to a political economy that
diverged from the classic liberal economists who were influential at the time. This task began in the 1980s5 and
continues until today, given the current value of the investigative findings of Marx about the structural and
historic determinants of social inequality in capitalism; and also considering the substantial resurgence of the
treatment of this theme of inequality and of human needs as one of its references, associated to liberty and
autonomy, by authors of intellectual weight such as Mészáros (2007), Gough (2003) and others. Finally, it is f ir
to indicate that my interest in this instigating and barely explored analytical line, coupled to the stimulating and
surprising work of Marx, was triggered by the reading of an old and enlightening essay about social policy by
Mishra (1975)6. I am thus indebted to Mishra for the initial (and providential) push into the reflections that
follow; while most of the path, particularly the stumbles, are exclusively my own responsibility.
The centrality of social inequality for the understanding of the meaning of (social) well-being in
Marx
Although Marxian theory does not deal explicitly with social policy, at least one reason justifies the
adoption of this theory as a reference for analysis of the theme: the fact that social inequality, related to the
appearance and maintenance of an indigent proletariat, under the influx of bourgeois exploitation, constituted
the basis of empiric support for the Marxian theoretical and political endeavor. Thus, it cannot be said that there
are no contributions in Marx’s work that help to elucidate the real movement of capitalist social policy, given
that the foundations of Marxian analyses about the accumulation of capital and the domination of the bourgeois
state continue to be historically confirmed and are at the essence of the explanation of the rise of this policy.
In addition, in his philosophical studies, the question of equality and liberty is recurringly contemplated,
which, like his scientific treatment of this question in Capital – whose first volume was written in 1867 – allows
identifying Marx’s intellectual and moral commitment to the issue of social well-being. His theories of revolution
and the dictatorship of the proletariat, as well as those concerning the extinction of the state, of capital and of
social classes, were not only built upon the reality of capitalist social inequality, but were based on the concept
of equality that supported all of his work. This allows the following deduction: with inequality as the justifying
fact of bourgeois social policy and equality its idealized parameter, no theory could provide greater support for
criticizing this policy than Marxian. This is because, to paraphrase Mishra (1982), it is the only theory that
addresses the issue of inequality in a broad form, that is, in its economic, political and social dimensions, and in
its capitalist and socialist versions. In addition, given its transformative disposition and, therefore, its commitment
to the construction of a truly egalitarian society, this theory is also the only one that at the same time that it
offers a wealth of arguments to provide an X-ray of the determinants and effects of social inequality in
capitalism, it foresees a solution for its eradication.
But, before conducting a review of the contribution of this theory, even if indirectly, bequeathed to the
study of capital social policy, it is fitting to explain two concepts that are, clearly or implicitly, central to
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understanding inequality in bourgeois societies and that, in this text, assume specific connotations: “accumulation”
and “legitimation”.
In general lines, accumulation is understood as the same historic process defined by Marx to counter the
definition of the classical political economists. Thus, instead of considering accumulation as savings to be
invested in search of profit, for the purpose of individual and collective progress, as conceived by Adam Smith
(1993), it is understood, as does Marx, that: capitalist accumulation results from the exploitation of the labor
force by the owners of the means of production, while striving for the expanded reproduction of capital.
Therefore, this process is directly related to the division of labor and to the extraction, by the capitalist, of the
surplus-value produced by the worker, which is reconverted into additional capital; which in turn allows greater
appropriation of surplus-value, which will be transformed into more additional capital and so on, thus characterizing
capital’s unending search for profit. The success of this mechanism, considered by Marx the driving force of
capitalist accumulation, requires the creation of a reserve army of workers that, through its competition with
the active workers in the labor market, prevents the establishment of an equilibrium between the value of the
labor force and the value of the product it realizes. This fact, allied to the constant improvement in production
from the use of more advanced and efficient methods and techniques, directly causes the deterioration of the
social conditions of workers. Therefore, “the accumulation of wealth in a pole is, simultaneously, accumulation
of misery, torment of labor, slavery, ignorance, brutalization and moral degradation on the opposing pole, that is,
from the side of class that produces its own product as capital” (MARX, 1984, p. 210).
However, while accumulation has a more economic character, legitimation has a strong political connotation.
This means that legitimation is more directly inscribed in the political spheres, given that only they can earn it or
lose it because legitimation constitutes the capacity of an institutional order to be recognized and accepted.
According to O’Connor (1977), the capitalist state, while maintaining and creating conditions favorable to the
accumulation process, simultaneously aims to assure minimum levels of social harmony by means of legitimation.
To do so, social policies can offer actions that help prevent or control discontent and rebellions; but can also
stimulate accumulation as when they invest in labor training, or compulsorily activate the requirements of
assistance policies for the labor market, as takes place today. This is why the concept of legitimation, which is
opposite that of usurpation and coercion, forms with these a unity of opposites, because where there is a
polemic about the legitimation of the political order, the more this is desired.
Meanwhile, the search for legitimation takes place in various forms. What is of particular interest to this
discussion is that which refers to the justification of the existence of the social state; that is the modern,
interventionist, capitalist State, which, by creating conditions for accumulation and obtaining consensus,
institutionalizes conflicts associated to the production and increase of social inequality. In this way, the social
state increasingly penetrates areas that previously had been the exclusive competence of the private sector,
which created, for the effects of its own legitimation, contradictory situations, that is: if on one hand it transformed
these new areas into important bulwarks of political management, on the other it saw the pressure increase on
itself, even from the working class, in search of private gain. This is the dilemma or the central contradiction of
the social State, not observed by the functionalist analyses and curiously not emphasized by O’Connor or by
various “Marxists”, which can be explained by a Marxian analysis of the fundamental contradictions found in
the concrete totality of the capitalist mode of production, and that are at the core of social inequality, as
explained below.
Substantive social equality versus bourgeois rights in Marx’s reflection
Tracing the concept of equality in Marx, whose work reveals a consistent unity between his philosophical,
economic and political thinking, it is found that he refers to the identical social position of men in classless
societies. This is a concept that shifts the discussion of equality from the realm of the state (an institution
primarily committed to the dominant class) to the realm of society without classes (a locus where differences
and conditions that can produce an unequal social position of men would be absent). In this way, Marx’s
position concerning equality does not indicate a defense of everyone’s equality in terms of their personal needs;
but the defense of the suppression of social classes and, as a consequence, of the equality of all in terms of
socioeconomic position. This is equivalent to saying that only with the socialization of the means of production,
and thus with the elimination of private property and of the exploitation of labor inherent to class societies, can
everyone count on equal opportunity of work and on salaries compatible with the production of each one.
Therefore, for Marx, equality is not confused with the uniformity of laws, as understood by liberal ideology, n r
with the suppression of all and any personal possession, as understood by a vulgar socialist vision and that of
primitive communism. For Marx, the private property that should be suppressed is that of the means of production,
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with people free to maintain their differences and maintain and or cultivate habits and values that better
correspond to the stimuli and material income of a collectivity that gives priority to the satisfaction of social
needs. In this way, the concept of equality has an affinity with that of liberty, considering that only in a society
of economic and social well-being, free of a concern for survival, will men be capable of incorporating the
cultural assets and moral values that will be available to everyone; and also of fully realizing their capacities and
potential (MARX; ENGELS, 2000). Only in a society free of social classes can the state become extinct and
thus, in the words of Engels (1975, p. 149), “the substitution of government over the people for the administration
of things and the control of the production processes”.
Men, once emancipated as “species-being” – and not as only politically emancipated subjects, as Marx
indicates in On The Jewish Question (1969), or even as mere citizens identified with the formal liberty compatible
with the inequality cultivated by liberal ideology – would be free of salaried work, realized under coercion;
therefore, they would be capable of enjoying the liberty of realizing their labor (considered in its specific
modality) their own humanity. Moreover: only then could men make their own history and realize their passage
from the kingdom of need to that of liberty (ENGELS, 1975, p. 151).
Upon speaking of work, it should be clarified that it is around this category as a tertium comparationis7
of real liberty and equality that Marx began to construct not only his economic theory, but also his idea of well-
being, an idea that was plainly divergent from the liberal-bourgeois concept. While in the later conception
equality and liberty can be measured by the expansion of the rights of citizenship – which, since the 18th
century have been presented as a possible conquest – in Marxian thinking they are not. For Marx, equality and
liberty can be measured based on the realization of labor as a vital and eternal need. Based on the supposition
that under like social conditions, each person realizes, in principle (as a value), equal work in the same period of
time, Marx sees in work not only the substance common to all goods, but the unit of measure of well-being in
society. Work as a parameter of comparison must be evaluated by its duration and intensity (abstracted from all
and any individual difference of the workers), if not it will no longer be a measure for comparison.
Advancing further in his reflections on the (implicit) concept of well-being in a society without classes,
vis-à-vis the ambiguities of the law associated to work, Marx maintained that in the first phase of communist
society, the distribution of rights proportionally to the labor of individuals is still a bourgeois right, which like any
right, presupposes inequality. Or, in his own terms:
[...] the right of the producers is proportional to the labor they supply […]. But, one man is superior to
another physically or mentally, and supplies more labor in the same time. This equal right is an unequal right
for unequal labor. It recognizes no class differences, because everyone is only a worker like everyone else;
but it tacitly recognizes unequal individual endowment, and thus productive capacity, as a natural privilege.
It is, therefore, a right of inequality, in its content, like every right. Right, by its very nature, can consist only
in the application of an equal standard; but unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals
if they were not unequal) are measurable only by an equal standard insofar as they are brought under an
equal point of view, are taken from one definite side only [...]. Thus, with an equal performance of labor, and
hence an equal in the social consumption fund, one will in fact receive more than another, one will be richer
than another, and so on. To avoid all these defects, right, instead of being equal, would have to be unequal
(MARX, 1970, p. 11).
An unequal right, in the Marxian sense is specifically related to the superior phase of communism, when
the contradictions of bourgeois society inherited by the phase of transition of the capitalist to the communist
order would have completely disappeared. For this to take place, although Marx recognizes the limitations of
the first phase of communism to in fact realize equality and liberty – or equalitarian liberty, to use Della Volpe’s
(1982) expression – he affirmed that in this phase, these contradictions, born in capitalist society after a long
and painful labor, are inevitable. The law, he maintains, “can never be higher than the economic structure of
society and its cultural development conditioned thereby” (MARX, 1970, p. 11-12); although if in this phase,
equality under the law is still a bourgeois right, at least the exploitation of man by man was already eliminated
and no one can take possession, as an owner, of the means of production (LENIN, 1978). These are the first
steps in the direction of an egalitarian society, towards well-being, in which, beyond the transformations of the
means of production into common property, ealized in the first phase, all of the disparities in the division of the
social product are also eliminated and of the inequality of bourge is law. Thus, according to Marx (1970, p. 11),
In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division
of labor, and therewith also the antithesis between mental and physical labor, h s vanished; after labor has
become not only a means of life but life’s prime want; after the productive forces have also increased with
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the all-around development of the individual, and all the springs of co-operative wealth flow more abundantly
– only then then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on
its banners: From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!
This makes it clear that, for Marx, the society of well-being would not be confined to the limits of an
economic revolution, that is, of a revolution solely concerned with the socialization of the means of production.
For well-being to imply substantive equality – to use Mészáros’ (2007) expression – and be put into practice, it
is necessary, according to Marx, that the division of labor and of the social product guarantee and be guaranteed
by the development and by the free action of the physical and intellectual faculties of individuals; this suggests
the importance of political participation in the conquest of autonomy (GOUGH, 2003) and in the preservation of
general well-being. In more than one text, in both the young and the mature Marx, political participation is
contemplated as an important requirement for transformation, aimed at substantive equality. This thinking is
present from his criticisms of the Hegelian ideas of the state (MARX, 1973), to his theories about society and
political economy, passing through analyses of specific events like those of the revolution of 1848 in France, the
dictatorship of Louis Napoleon, and the Paris Commune. But it was the reflections on the Paris Commune
contained in The Civil War in France (MARX, 1977), which best portray the Marxian concept of this type of
participation, as will be discussed below.
Marx between false antitheses: economic versus political and reform versus revolution
It is in his writing on the Paris Commune, which is considered the prelude to his theory of revolution, that
his position became clear concerning the problematic discussed until today about: a) the priority, or not, of
economic over political premises, in social transformation; b) the exclusivity, or not, of the participation of
workers in this process; and c) the rejection, or not, by Marxian theory of the anti-capitalist reformist changes
within capitalism.
Concerning the priority of economic premises, Marx affirmed that although the general context of France
in 1870 did not exhibit the material conditions needed to overthrow the ruling classist monarchical regime, it did
not fail to have exceptional super-structural conditions that politically facilitated this intent. Given the weakening
of the state apparatus by the French-German W r, the workers, even if insufficiently organized, were able to
implant, through spontaneous action, forms of direct democracy, which were essential to the emancipatory
political action of the proletariat. Here becomes clear the importance Marx gave to the strategic political
struggles for the conquest of power, that is, to the action of individuals. It is this attitude, although it does not
disregard economic determinations, in the final instance, that belies the stigma that Marx overemphasized
economic factors that is affirmed by those who are restricted to a mechanical interpretation of his reference to
“natural laws of capitalist production” in the preface of the first edition of Capital. Related to this clarification
is also the Marxian position concerning the workers participation in revolutionary progress, which reveals once
again a refutation of the idea that for Marx, the sole protagonist of history is the proletariat.
Effectively, although Marx begins with the principle that only the independent struggle of the proletariat
can lead to workers’ liberation from the yoke of capital, his analysis of the Paris Commune gives a vote of
confidence to the participation of popular groups in the struggle for structural transformation. Thus, in relation
to this event, he demonstrates acceptance of all resources and tendencies that contribute to the reconquering of
political power by the popular masses, considering to be most important, in the Republic implanted by the
communards of Paris (in addition to the substitution of the permanent army by the “armed people”), the
creation of an executive committed to the people and administered by it. This is what can be inferred from the
following statement:
The majority of its members were naturally working men, or acknowledged representatives of the working
class. The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same
time. Instead of continuing to be the agent of the Central Government, the police was at once stripped of its
political attributes, and turned into the responsible and at all times revocable agent of the Commune. So
were the officials of all other branches of the Administration. From the members of the Commune downwards,
the public service had to be done at workmen’s wages. [...] Public functions ceased to be the private
property of the tools of the Central Government (MARX, 1977, p. 41).
Nevertheless, in terms of the historic importance of the political form assumed by the Commune, which
was characterized by alliances between the working class and broad sectors of the French population – the
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urban petty bourgeoisie and peasants – and by universal suffrage in the election of the directive councils, Marx
still did not see this as a socialist revolution, but as a necessary preparatory phase to achieve this goal. For this
reason it is understood that for Marx the Paris Commune represented a concrete example of anti-capitalist
reform within capitalism, which took shape in the transition from a monarchy to a republic, and as such, was a
prerequisite to a later and more radical transformation. The Commune – an uprising of the discontented masses
of the proletariat and petty-bourgeois against the French monarchy – before realizing the transformation of the
social and political organization of France into a federation of autonomous municipalities, began to support the
route to communism, supported in formulas that, according to Lenin’s cr ticism (1978), signified a petty-bourgeois
democratic government; or that is, a popular government that, despite its radical break with the bourgeois state
and the implantation of direct democracy, did not outline, as Marx foresaw, the route to future proletarian
revolutions; and this is because, among other problems, the revolutionaries confused the struggle for the republic
with the struggle for socialism.
Nevertheless, despite the contradictions and obstacles experienced by the Commune, it was the successful
preamble to a socialist revolution; and as a process of popular political participation, it continues to be the most
significant example of the action of anticapitalist movements linked to Marxian thinking. The Chinese communists,
for example, cite the Paris Commune as an example for their cultural revolution (MOMMSEN; MESCHKAT,
1975). In addition, the history of the Commune awoke strong interest among Marxist intellectuals in the West,
who came to recognize, according to Mommsen and Meschkat, that Marx’s thinking had only become converted
into the Marxism that is known today thanks to his reflections about the experiences of the Paris Commune.
Moreover, the rebellions of 1968, in France, not only revived (even if temporarily) the experience of the
Commune, but also came to demand a deeper theoretical analysis of political participation, conceived by Marx,
in the current revolutionary process, with an eye on a “society” of well-being.
Therefore, the tracing of the concept of well-being in Marx’s work will also have to consider his writings
on economics and detect in them the reaffirmation of his interest in the conquest of social equality found in his
political writings.
Marx and the English welfare institutions
In both his political and economic reflections, Marx was little concerned8 with the welfare institutions found
at that time (the Poor Law, of 1834, for example) and with the growing state intervention in Victorian England; nor
in understanding them in their specificities. Foreseeing the extinction of the state, Marx did not see how well-being
would be achieved through the operations of state organization that were committed primarily to the interests of
the dominant classes. Therefore, he maintained that the state would always be a tool for the domination and
maintenance of the class structure and as such, an institution incapable of guaranteeing social well-being.
Therefore, to detect Marx’s involvement with some aspect related to the regulatory action of the state in
the social field, and then draw inferences about his position concerning the conquest of well-being by workers at
the heart of capitalism, what should be examined is the factory legislation discussed in Capital. Here, unlike any
of the classical theoreticians or even the old and modern socialists, Marx analyzed laws that regulated factory
activities (the Factory Acts); reports of the public health authorities; factory inspections; and the various investigative
commissions established by the English Parliament. Even so, the study of the factory legislation as an institution for
worker protection, assumed a limited scope in his theory. The analysis merely collaborated with his broader
proposal to better understand the social relations of production in its multiple determinations and in its more
evolved form of representation and control (under capitalism). Therefore, in terms of Marx’s contributions, both to
the study of legal regulation of capitalist labor processes, and to issues related to the living conditions of workers,
and to social programs (as in the case of accident prevention, healthcare and education), the profile of his concept
of well-being must be detected in passages spread throughout his work.
This is not to say that Marx’s analysis of English factory legislation and about equality and liberty cannot
indicate elements of a Marxian sociology of well-being. What is to be emphasized is that this sociology, because
it is not easily perceivable, becomes fallacious if it is restricted to isolated interpretations of Marxian thought
about the theme.
It is in the attempt to avoid this fallacy that I intend to relate Marx’s analysis of factory legislation with his
positions about political participation inscribed in his reflections on the Paris Commune. And based on this
relation, identify the common thread that articulates the philosophical, scientific and political principles that
serve as a basis for his transformative vision. Actually, it is not possible to differentiate the political and scientific
limits of Marx’s theory and praxis, or of his intellectual and ethical posture, given that these spheres are
inseparable. Therefore, it is valid to affirm that there were never breaks between the young and the mature
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Marx, nor between Marx the philosopher, scientist or political activist. In reality, Marx’s great originality consists
essentially in his impressive ability to articulate, with critical creativity, the multiple aspects of social life and the
multiple intellectual supports of various thinkers from different tendencies.
This fact is substantiated in his analysis of factory legislation, a type of case study within the realm of his
theory about labor, in which can also be identified his position in relation to social reform, to the bipolar
confrontation of classes and to the priority of the economic over the political, already detected in his writings on
the Paris Commune.
Effectively, in his study of factory legislation, Marx reaffirmed his regard for the struggle of workers
within capitalism, with the goal of improving their living and working conditions and their salaries. This, in his
perspective, is perfectly compatible with the correlation of forces existing in the realm of the productive system
and with the disputes related to the confrontation between the antagonistic interests of the fundamental classes
(bourgeois and proletariat). Thus, he understands that the
effort to achieve the factory legislation to be one of the first
conscious reactions of the working class against the
exploitation to which it was submitted, and for which they
had the support of other groups and class factions, who were
also harmed by the privileges and domination of the industri-
al capitalists, as was the case of the agrarian aristocracy.
Without underestimating the importance of these adhesions
to labor’s cause (a fact that once again indicates his
predisposition to emphasize all the forces that contribute to
the success of the worker’s struggle, and his non-alignment
to an orthodox concept of bipolar class conflict), what
appeared to him to be more significant in this process was
not so much the conquest of this legislation, but the restriction
this conquest imposed on the despotism of capital. This is
related to a position counter to the thesis of absolute
pauperization, which was incorrectly attributed to Marx. In
the understanding that salary is composed of two elements
– the physical and the social-historical – Marx affirmed that:
the latter element is susceptible to alterations that can result
both from spontaneous factors, related to the ups and downs
of the economic cycles, as well as the political action of the
workers against the reduction of the real salary to that needed
to meet their real physiological needs. It is thanks to the
historic-social element of salary that it is possible for the
working class to conquer not only salary increases, but to also impose legal restrictions that, beyond the
economic “iron law” of salaries, check the propensity of this law to limit the remuneration of the labor
force to the absolute minimum.
This is why labor legislation earned Marx’s sympathy. In and of itself, it had little significance in terms of
social transformation, although it had brought physical, moral and intellectual benefits to workers. But, if seen
from the perspective of the principle that it represents, or that is, that it is possible to counter the economic
policy of the property-owning class with the economic policy of the working class, more than a political conquest,
the factory legislation is a theoretical confirmation.
However, it is worth emphasizing that Marx’s recognition of the importance of factory legislation as a
conquest of workers against the interests of capital has stirred polemics about the incompatibility of this recognition
with his revolutionary proposals. It is that an analysis less attentive to the nuances that permeate this proposal
tend to identify in Marx two ideas of change: one, political, the result of permanent conflict between productive
forces and the relations of production that, in turn, will stimulate the contradictions in the different realms of
social life, especially between the antagonistic classes; and the other, economic and legal, which, in the case of
factory legislation, appears to point to the defense of a reformist process in which changes take place gradually
within the capitalist system. But, this dualism does not occur in Marx. A closer examination of the Marxian
theory of revolution will show that the theory is mounted on the bases of the process of production, but is not
reduced exclusively to this. Therefore, everything that contributes to the necessary and growing awareness of
man in the labor process is converted into consciousness of the labor process and of the possibilities for change
in a spiral of distinct determinations. The revolutionary process encompasses economic, cultural and political
components that are mutually reinforcing, although the principal weight falls on the changes of the economic
Mar x’s disbelief in the
transformative power of
factory legislation is thus clear,
as well as his conviction that
the proletariat should see this
power as merely a strategic
component of their greater
struggle for complete well-
being, which he identified with
human emancipation from the
fetters of capital – despite the
gains provided by the law.
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base. For this reason, revolution for Marx appears not to mean only the total revolutionary process. It can be a
political revolution, as that of the Paris Commune, supported in cultural values that were determined, in the final
instance, by the internal contradictions of the economic process in a specific historic context9.
For this reason the importance of factory legislation as a contribution to the awakening of the proletarian
consciousness that the domination of labor by capital is not inevitable, and of Marx’s efort (1983, p. 13) to
relate this legislation to the possibility that a political struggle would also stimulate changes or better circumstances.
So much so that, by having this possibility in mind, he affirms: “even when a society discovers the tracks of the
natural law of its development [...] it cannot jump or suppress by decree its natural phases of development. But
it can abbreviate and reduce the birth pains.” It is in the possibility of abbreviating the pains of childbirth that
Marx inserts the legislative interference in the labor issues, at the same time in which he reveals, when addressing
the issue, his recognition of the relative autonomy of the state, that is: the relative independence of the political
order from the economic infrastructure of the bourgeois state, like that in England in 19th century England,
which, under pressure from different interests, could no longer be seen as a pure and simple tool of the
bourgeoisie. This is a line of thinking in Marx about the state – which is little explored – which discredits the
handling of social policy only from the perspective of its functionality to the capitalist system, as is seen by
various authors who call themselves Marxists.
This, however, is not to say that Marx was unaware of the ambiguities of the capitalist state, in regard
to compliance with legislation, as well as the limitations and precarious nature of this compliance imposed by
the structural power of capital. Marx was aware that, in capitalism, the state constantly falls into contradiction
before the incompatibility of the legal principle of isonomy, with the conflicting and unequal reality of a
society divided into classes. Despite recognizing in the preface of Capital that the British government,
unlike the German, imposed some control on industrial owners, he never had an illusion about the fact that
the state gave priority to the interests of the dominant classes. And despite confessing that “where capitalist
production is fully implanted (in Germany for example), in the factories themselves, the conditions are worse
than in England, because there is no counterweight from the factory laws” (MARX, 1983, p. 12), he did not
fail to denounce, in England, the devices used by the capitalists and by the bourg ois state to avoid the law.
Thus, in Capital, he describes various ways in which owners ignore the law, with the compliance of the
state, as well as the manipulative and deceitful manner parliamentary authorities investigated irregularities
by employers, in detriment to labor justice.
Conclusion
Marx’s disbelief in the transformative power of factory legislation is thus clear, as well as his conviction
that the proletariat should see this power as merely a strategic component of their greater struggle for complete
well-being, which he identified with human emancipation from the fetters of capital – despite the gains provided
by the law. This is because, under capitalism, in fact, the principles of economic competitiveness and of political
coercion that, based on mechanisms such as the industrial reserve army and its depressive effects on salaries,
lead to a growing (but not absolutely fatal) pauperization of the labor force, despite the liberal utopian measures
for social protection.
Thus, total well-being for Marx is a phenomenon that is based on the principles of solidarity and cooperation,
identified with an effective attention to human needs, morally and historically founded on the collectivized
process of production and distribution of the social product10; and not on the principles of competition and
coercion, which are identified with the process of private profitability that results from the exploitation and
manipulation of the labor force as a special commodity, as is implicit in the liberal-bourgeois concept of social
protection by the capitalist state and of the rights of citizenship.
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Notes
1 When I speak of Marx and in Marxian production, that is, Marx’s own work, I am not excluding the participation of Engels in a number of these
texts.
2 Upon speaking of a “type of sociology” of Marxian well-being, I want to say that although there is no such specific sociology (in the same way
he has no economics, anthropology etc.), has a vision of the totality of the capitalistic historic process in which the social, the political and the
economic are inseparable dimensions. Therefore, it is possible to observe in his work two main scientific affinities with the social sciences, and
sociologists in particular: a) the scientific-historic character of his analyses about capitalist society, expressed in his intent to embrace them beyond
their appearance. This is a form of detectable “scientificness” in Marx that is explicit in his thought: “all science would be superfluous if the form
of manifestation [the appearance] and the essence of things immediately coexisted” (MARX, 1985, p. 271); b) the fact that Marx made an
enormous contribution to a theory of well-being doted simultaneously with scientificness, a critical position and an intention to transform.
3        From Greek mythology: a sacred place in Ancient Greece, dedicated to the god Apollo, where Pythia entered in trance and issued responses as
absolute truths.
4 Statement Marx (1983, p. 20), directed at the German bourgeois philosophers who treated Hegel with disrespect and cowardice.
5 During the doctoral course, begun in 1982 at Iuperj, and completed in 1987 at UnB, which led to the thesis entitled Crítica marxista da teoria e
da prática da política social no capitalismo: peculiaridades da experiência brasileira (PEREIRA, 1987) [Marxist criticism of the theory and
practice of social policy in capitalism: peculiarities of the Brazilian experience].
6 This essay was, later, deepened and inserted as a chapter in his book Society and Social Policy: theories and practice of welfare (MISHRA,1982).
7 A third common element between two comparable things.
8 This lack of interest can be attributed to Marx’s moral and intellectual performance in explaining the determinants of social misery, gen ated by
capitalism, and of knowing a definitive alternative for this misery.
9 About this see Marx (1973, 1978, 1987). In the Communist Manifesto (1987), he emphasizes a practical issue: the class struggle. Here he not only
analyzes the essential postulates of this struggle, but convokes the workers of the entire world to join together. And, in keeping with this
orientation, assumes an advanced position before political economy – if compared to the content of the Econ mic and Philosophical Manuscripts,
in 1844, with the Poverty of Philosophy, of 1846/47 (2001) – by proposing “the substitution of the program against property in general for the
project for the collective appropriation of the means of production, thus grasping by the roots both the functioning of the capitalist mode of
production and the source of alienation of man who lives in a society of this type” (MARX, 1978, p. XVII).
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10 Marx, contrary to liberal-bourgeois ideology, did not relate basic human needs to a minimum of physiologically determined subsistence.  Th
“natural needs of the worker”, he affirmed, “such as food, clothing, fuel and housing, vary according to climate and other physical conditions of
his country. On the other hand, the number and the proportion of the so-called indispensable requirements [...] are, in and of themselves, the
product of a historic evolution and therefore depend to a large degree on the degree of civilization of the country” (SWEEZY, 1974, p. 288).  This
suggests that social needs are difficult to precisely qualify. As an objective fact, they can be identified and measured approximately in each society
and in each epoch.
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